Showing posts with label Eastern Europe. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Eastern Europe. Show all posts

Friday, May 2, 2014

The Russian depression

Amid geopolitical uncertainty over the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian economy has entered an economic recession and suffered a massive flight of foreign capital.  The hope of an emerging Russian middle class gets fainter still.  

Bleak growth
The BBC quoted an IMF representative saying that Russia had its second trimester of negative economic growth, which is generally considered the criterion for defining a recession.

The IMF's concluding statement for the 2014 article IV consultation mission for the Russian Federation points out that the current Russian economic model is obsolete and will not provide further basis for sustained growth: "After almost 15 years of growth based on rising oil prices, successful macroeconomic stabilization policies, and increasing use of spare resources, this growth framework has reached its limits".  Indeed, the source of Russian economic problems go far beyond the Ukrainian crisis.  

Apart from needing a new economic model, Russia also needs further economic integration to the rest of the world: "More integration with the world economy should help close the productivity gap with other countries, foster investment and diversification, and enhance growth. On the other hand, less integration with the world economy would slow this process, missing out on available opportunities for technological transfers and the exploitation of comparative advantages."  The Ukrainian crisis is not prone to help Russian relations with international partners.

Russia's real GDP growth prospect has taken a slump and the IMF corrected their prediction for 2014 and 2015 to 0,2% and 1%: 

Source: WEO (April 2014) and the IMF's concluding statement for the 2014 article IV consultation mission for the Russian Federation.  

Capital outflow
The outflow of capital from the Russian market has amounted to approximately 70 billion US dollars for the first quarter of 2014 as opposed to 63 billion US dollars for the combined 4 quarters of 2013.  

President Putin has formerly threatened sanctions against Western companies, citing the energy sector as a potential victim.  However, the real impact of the Russian reaction might not come in the form of formal sanctions but rather with foreign companies finding government interactions especially hard. 


Depression or recession?
Although the Russian economy is in recession, a recession alone is not enough for a depression to be called.  Depressions are periods of deep dysfunction of the economy.  In that regard, the fragile economic system relying on energy exports could collapse with a unified European energy policy seeking alternatives to Russian gas and fracking for natural gas.  

The Russian middle class
With the Russian recession, a flight of foreign capital, and a negative geopolitical situation, the government-independent middle class will have a hard time finding jobs and business opportunities that allow it to grow.

For Europeans, the news of a Russian recession are both good and bad.  On the one hand, economic difficulties can make Putin think twice before engaging into a costly military campaign in Eastern Ukraine.  On the other hand, a democratic transition cannot happen without a healthy middle class.  Short-term security relief from the economy comes at the price of a long-term security.  

Thursday, January 23, 2014

Ukraine: the story of an economic racket

Ukraine: the story of an economic racket

Ukraine is nowhere near bankrupt – the bankruptcy narrative misled its population and observers into an economic racket that steered the country away from the EU’s economic and political bloc and pushed it closer to Russia’s projected economic and political Eurasian Union.  Five pro-EU protesters were killed yesterday as the Yanukovich government adopted a tough stance on protesters, indicating a possible Ukrainian drift towards authoritarianism. 

Ukrainian bankruptcy – a myth
Ukraine has been said to be on the verge of bankruptcy and to have trouble refinancing its external debt.  Although it indeed has trouble with the second for motives of national politics, it is nowhere near bankrupt – its macroeconomic health indicators show a story similar to many other Post-Soviet countries, with its national debt being 37% of GDP and comparing advantageously to an EU average of 85% for 2012[1].  What is at the center of Ukraine’s perceived insolvency is the refusal of the IMF to finance its foreign for one important yet little-known reason: the cut of gas subsidies to Ukrainian households, a USSR legacy[2].  The Ukrainian government cripples its macroeconomic situation in two ways: it spends a hefty sum of money in gas subsidies, effectively raising gas consumption above market levels, consequently subsidizing Russian Gazprom’s gas exports to Ukraine; heavy gas consumption artificially raises the need for foreign currencies above the natural level, stimulating a trade deficit. 

In the current situation, an IMF loan to Ukraine would see some of its funds transformed as a subsidy to Russian Gazprom, which could hardly be acceptable to Western lenders.  However, a slashing of subsidies would be extremely unpopular among Ukrainians.  

The EU accession agreement theater
The Yanukovich government, who refused to cut household heating subsidies on gas in order to obtain a loan from the IMF to refinance its external debt, invoked a narrative of imminent bankruptcy to demand 20B euros of financial support from its neighbours in return for the signing of the accession treaty[3].  The EU, pressured in handing out a hefty sum of money to sign an accession treaty with Ukraine that would bring Ukraine firmly Western influence, refused to give in to Yanukovich’s extortion.  

At that time, the IMF had already engaged in a dialogue with Ukrainian authorities about its external debt and published a statement on October 31 2013 detailing the problems affecting Ukraine.  Given that nothing had been done to remedy these problems, the Yanukovych government knew very well that the EU would refuse to be extorted.  It was then safe for the pro-Russian Ukrainian government to create this external debt crisis and then feign surprise at the European refusal.  It then shouted its distress out to the world and carried this theatre to its logical ending: a Russian rescue. 

Economic racketeering
It could be argued that the Ukrainian government’s position on this issue was a miscalculation, a fluke.  However, Nicu Popescu from the European Union Institute for Security Studies reported that the Russian strategy  “[...] would also be complemented with carrots, with the strategy speaking of the need to provide more opportunities for business groups that take heed of the Russian message and start working against the Association Agreement, and the need to incentivise Yanukovich’s family and inner circle by offering them specific money-making opportunities on the Russian market.”[4] 

Either the Yanukovich government is extremely amateurish and failed to appreciate the thought that Ukraine couldn’t extort its way into the EU or it just plain sold its country to foreign interests.  Either way, economic racketeering itself should wash away any legitimacy the Yanukovich government has to rule Ukraine - and that is not even considering the violent repression of its population or the 2004 Orange Revolution triggered by massive election fraud in favour of current-president Yanukovich. 





Details and data
Reasons for the IMF to assess Ukraine’s macroeconomic environment negatively: “The mission and the authorities consider that a set of comprehensive and credible reforms is needed to address vulnerabilities and revive growth. The mission recommends that the reform agenda include: (i) increased exchange rate flexibility combined with policies to strengthen the financial sector; (ii) ambitious fiscal consolidation; (iii) increases in domestic energy tariffs, and (iv) comprehensive structural reforms to improve the business climate and support growth.” 
International Monetary Fund.  Statement by IMF Mission to Ukraine.  Press Release No. 13/419

The IMF’s assessment of gas subsidies: “The large loss-making energy sector needs to be reformed. The low retail tariffs (covering only a small fraction of economic costs) generate quasi-fiscal losses, balance of payment weaknesses, underinvestment in domestic production, and governance problems. As a priority measure, we advise a significant upfront increase in gas and heating tariffs for households and adoption of a schedule for further increases until cost recovery is reached. To mitigate the effect of tariff adjustment on the less affluent, we recommend scaling up targeted social assistance programs that would cover up to 40 percent of the population.”
International Monetary Fund.  Statement by IMF Mission to Ukraine.  Press Release No. 13/419


Details on Ukraine’s demand of 20B euros in exchange of signing the accession agreement: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-asks-eu-for-20bn-in-return-for-signing-association-agreement-8998714.html

Articles and press releases
Popescu, Nicu.  The Russia-Ukraine trade spat.  European Institute for Security Issues.  Alerts - No26 - 30 August 2013.  http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/the-russia-ukraine-trade-spat/

International Monetary Fund.  Statement by IMF Mission to Ukraine.  Press Release No. 13/419

Macroeconomic data
World Economic Outlook Database, October 2013 Edition.  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx.  Data used for this article are series General government gross debt and General government primary net lending/borrowing


2012 data
Debt as % of GDP
Government Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)
Armenia
38.91
-0.592
Belarus
41.87
1.981
Kazakhstan
12.45
3.883
Poland
55.59
-1.09
Russia
12.45
0.805
Uzbekistan
8.64
8.558
Ukraine
37.42
-2.55

Eurostat.  gov_dd_edpt1 series; INDIC_NA = Government Consolidated Gross Debt.   http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database






[1] Eurostat.  gov_dd_edpt1 series; INDIC_NA = Government Consolidated Gross Debt.   http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
World Economic Outlook Database, October 2013 Edition.  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx.  Data used for this article are series General government gross debt and General government primary net lending/borrowing
[4] Popescu, Nicu.  The Russia-Ukraine trade spat.  European Institute for Security Issues.  Alerts - No26 - 30 August 2013.  http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/the-russia-ukraine-trade-spat/